As climate change accelerates the melting of Arctic ice and opens up new strategic vulnerabilities in Canada’s vast northern territories, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is revisiting a long-dormant idea: the acquisition of amphibious assault ships tailored for polar operations.
Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the RCN, has recently commented on the concept of a Canadian-built, ice-strengthened vessel that could serve as a mobile base for deploying troops and equipment in remote, infrastructure-scarce regions. This proposal comes amid Canada’s broader push to ramp up defence spending and modernize its military capabilities in response to evolving global threats.
Reviving an Old Concept Amid New Realities
The notion of amphibious landing ships for the Canadian Navy is not entirely new. For over two decades, the idea has surfaced periodically but has consistently been sidelined by budgetary constraints and shifting priorities. In 2015, for instance, Canada explored purchasing Mistral-class amphibious assault ships from France after a deal with Russia fell through due to geopolitical tensions over Ukraine. However, those discussions never materialized into a concrete acquisition.
Today, the strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. With Arctic sea routes becoming more navigable and foreign powers like Russia and China increasing their presence in the region, Canada faces heightened pressure to assert sovereignty over its northern waters. The RCN’s current fleet, while capable, lacks specialized vessels for sustained operations in ice-covered areas without relying on limited port facilities. Topshee’s proposal aims to address this gap by envisioning a ship that can operate independently in harsh polar conditions.
A Viable Design and Capabilities?
According to Topshee, in a year-end interview with CBC News, the envisioned amphibious landing ship would be a Polar Class 2 vessel, designed to break through moderate ice thicknesses while maintaining operational effectiveness. This classification would allow it to navigate Arctic waters year-round, a critical feature given that most northern Canadian communities lack year-round ice-free ports—the nearest reliable option being in Nuuk, Greenland.
The ship would function as an “Arctic mobile base,” equipped to carry smaller landing craft—potentially hovercraft for enhanced mobility over ice and rough terrain—and helicopters for aerial support. This configuration would enable the rapid deployment of personnel, vehicles, and supplies directly from sea to shore, bypassing the need for prepared infrastructure.
Topshee emphasized the strategic value of such a capability in a recent interview: “The key value proposition of an amphibious ship is it can deliver capability from sea to shore without prepared port infrastructure, and that describes our North perfectly.”
He illustrated this with a hypothetical scenario: assisting a distressed community in the High Arctic during the depths of winter, such as in February, where traditional logistics would be severely hampered by ice and remoteness.
Further elaborating on the operational rationale, Topshee noted, “To sustain an operation up in the North, we sort of realized that some form of Arctic mobile base probably made a lot of sense, and that is effectively what an amphibious ship is.”
Preliminary discussions have already been held with major Canadian shipbuilders, including Davie Shipyard in Lévis, Quebec, and Seaspan in Vancouver, both of which are currently involved in constructing the Canadian Coast Guard’s new icebreaker fleet. Topshee reported that these builders have indicated a Polar Class 2 amphibious ship is “theoretically possible,” though no formal designs or contracts are in place yet.
Challenges and Fiscal Considerations
Despite the enthusiasm, Topshee has been cautious about raising expectations, describing the idea as “a conceptual thing” and a mere “thought exercise” at this stage.
There is no official policy commitment from the government, and the proposal remains exploratory. Historical precedents suggest that such ambitious projects often falter due to fiscal and institutional hurdles. Canada’s defence procurement processes are notoriously slow and prone to cost overruns, as seen with ongoing programs like the Canadian Surface Combatant frigates and new submarines.
Costs for such a vessel remain unspecified, but similar amphibious ships in other navies can run into the billions of dollars per unit, depending on size and capabilities. Timelines are equally vague, with no procurement process initiated. However, the idea could gain traction as part of Canada’s upcoming defence policy review in 2026, which will assess alignment with emerging threats. This review follows the current government’s recent commitment to increase defence spending to up to 5% of GDP by 2029 (with 3.5% allocated directly to the military and 1.5% to infrastructure), a significant jump from current levels.
Broader Context in Canadian Defence Modernization
The amphibious ship concept fits into a larger pattern of Canadian military upgrades. In July 2024, Canada announced plans to acquire up to 12 conventionally powered, under-ice-capable submarines to bolster maritime deterrence across its three coasts. Additionally, the RCN has received new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), such as the Harry DeWolf class, to enhance sovereignty patrols. These initiatives reflect growing concerns over Arctic security, where melting ice is not only opening trade routes but also exposing vulnerabilities to potential adversaries.
Experts within the defence community have mixed views. While some see the amphibious capability as essential for rapid response in remote areas, others prioritize addressing the RCN’s existing challenges, such as severe personnel shortages and aging fleets. In a 2023 statement, Topshee himself highlighted the “critical state” of the Navy, with 30-year-old Halifax-class frigates needing to serve until at least 2040.
Let’s do it. A great idea it’s what we need. And it should be Canadian build.
I honestly think it’s a good idea. While Canada doesn’t need an aircraft carrier, a helicopter carrier/landing ship could prove useful given our historical use of our navy and it would be cheaper I think than building Arctic ports. Just my thoughts.
This would provide a whole new dimension to our naval capabilities. Great for artic sovereignty and humanitarian missions. And the military is talking about replacing our armies helicopters, add the choppers needed for these into the contract. Two such vessels would be nice, 3 would be better. One can dream. Lol
Hovercraft should be considered as well and have been somewhat proven by US forces in supporting amphibious operations
Instead of the many eggs in one basket, Look up the M.V. Susitna. Imagine a moderate open water speed, icebreaking, landing craft. A bit outside the box. Topsides custom to those who commission. Suppose little birdies should mind themselves.
Canada would do well as a start by procuring and deploying a RCN ‘Arctic Mobile Base’ (a support ship with air and landing capabilities, and stores, fuel, medical and other services), pending (costly and long) development of permanent infrastructure in the North. One or more Arctic Mobile Base would provide much more flexibility. The terms ‘Amphibious Assault Ship’ and ‘Amphibious Landing Ship’ should be avoided. Shades of Iwo Jima and Normandy, and people will compare with US, Russian, Chinese, etc., amphibious forces and what they do (power projection). Amphibiosity (UK term), whether assaults against hostile shores or raids, is not something the RCN is espousing (though it did have landing forces in the Second World War). Besides, ‘amphibious’ is usually an adjective to ‘warfare’ and ‘landing’ to ‘ship.’ To assist public understanding, the terminology should be clear from the beginning.
I very much like the idea and I believe it could be beneficial to Canada … providing not only military functionality (NATO/UN/sovereign aspects) but also has capabilities for disaster relief. … It is thou an expensive prospect. Typically to have one warship fully operational, one needs three warships. ie a 3-to-1 ratio (or “rule of three”) is a longstanding naval planning guideline, with one warship in long term refit, one in working up or in minor maintenance, and one fully operational. i suspect this ratio holds for Amphibious assault ships also.
Further the costs of manning such ships, the costs of the embarked equipment, and the costs of maintenance of such equipment is non-trivial, and dependent on the military scope of the embarked equipment, the costs can equal that of one ship in itself, and possibly even cost more. There may be ways to mitigate such, but with any such mitigation comes compromises in capability.
Still, I look favorably upon the possibility of this being pursued.
Excellent idea! Minimum two one on station/forward deployed! Capable of carrying an F35B (in otherwords convert the F35A current order for 16 into 16 F35Bs). Yes this is expensive but the cost for maintaining several Arctic land based airbases is somewhat offset. Get the Grippens for the RCAF and recreate the RCNAirservice along with the Cyclones.
David Dunlop
Hello ReadyAyeReady. Your AI Conceptualized Design seems to be just about what Canada will need if it is Polar Class 2 configured. A Canadian Arctic Polar Class 2 Amphibious Sea Lift Capability is not a “modest incremental evolution”, but a sorely needed priority that Canada requires in a rapidly changing geopolitical world now and in the long term. It is not a ‘nice to have’ capability, but rather an urgent priority for Canada right now! The fact that Canada is strongly considering a Polar Class 2 Strategic Sea Lift Capability speaks volumes to a capability that is long overdue and I believe will be a much-needed capability for Canada in the not-too-distant future. Canada is the only G7 country without an amphibious sea lift capability. Yes, Canada has flirted with this capability before, when France was willing to sell Canada the Mistral Class LHD (with no Polar Class designation) for amphibious & HA/DR, and we all know how that worked out. However, there are other options on the market today including; The Spanish Juan Carlos LHD; The Italian Trieste Class LHA; The German Blohm Voss Class LHD design and of course the America Class LHA. In the Fall of 2024 I wrote an Article for the Canadian Naval Review (CNR) called “A Strategic Canadian Amphibious Sealift Capability in CNR Vol. 13-4. It can be viewed at: https://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/CNR_pdf_full/cnr_vol13_4.pdf.
The problem with all of these LHD/LHA Sealift vessel designs I have mentioned, is that they all do not have an Arctic Polar Class 2 rating which means that this Canadian Amphibious Sealift Fleet has not been built…. yet. The Diefenbaker Class Polar Class 2 Ice Breaker now being built by both Davie & SeaSpan shipyards are the closest to what would be required for a Canadian amphibious sealift capability. This capability will not be cheap though, and will probably be well over 30,000 + tonnes & over 180 meters long with a wider beam & deeper draft than what is now being built for the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). A fleet of at least 4 of these Polar Class 2 amphibious sealift ships for sealift operations and Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief (HA/DR) will be required. Based on the Polar Class 2 Ice Breakers being built now for the CCG, this ship can be built with Canadian ingenuity & know-how. With Canada quickly attaining its NATO goals of 2% of GDP this year & going to 5% of GDP by 2030, and with more “trained personnel”, this capability will happen. It took Australia however, over 20 years to gain this capability with their Canberra Class LHD (Juan Carlos design) and they are still not quite there yet, so, it may be a slow process.
Even a G-LAAM type vessel with Polar Class 2 capabilities that has been “put forth” by others, will still not have the Amphibious & HA/DR Arctic capabilities the RCN requires. Nothing less than an LHA/LHD type vessel with at least Polar Class 2 capabilities will be required in order for the RCN to do the job needed for amphibious & HA/DR duties. We already had our chance years ago when the French were willing to sell Canada the Mistral Class (with no Polar Class designation) for amphibious & HA/DR, and we all know how that worked out. I still contend that the Spanish Juan Carlos LHD Class (if built to Polar Class 2 requirements) would be a much better option for the RCN. The training to evolve this amphibious capability will take a long time though. The Juan Carlos LHD is roughly about 27,500 tonnes and with a PC 2 requirement, it would bring total weight well pass 30,000 tonnes alone not including ‘full load’ and could be built in Canada as well. Canada could never acquire 12 of these G-LAAM ships ($$) as others have envisioned, however a fleet of at least 4 Amphibious HA/DR LHD icebreaker type LHD’s will be an effective alternative and could work for the RCN and the CAF.
It is worth noting that a precedent for such an arctic capable LHD vessel already exists in part: France previously designed and built two “Arctic-hardened” Mistral-class LHD ships, the Vladivostok and Sevastopol, for the Russian Navy. Although the sale was ultimately canceled in 2014 and the ships were resold to Egypt, the design featured significant cold-weather modifications, including a reinforced hull for light ice operations, a heated flight deck to prevent icing, and an enclosed well-deck to protect landing craft from extreme elements. This demonstrates that adapting the Mistral design for polar environments is not only conceptually viable but has been physically realized in the past.
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Beyond its primary role as a power-projection and major support platform for Canadian Arctic sovereignty, a potential Canadian LHD (such as a hypothetical “Canadianized” Mistral-class) could offer transformative “force multiplier” capability for a task force in blue-water environments. By leveraging its expansive flight deck and 1,800-square-meter hangar, the ship conceivably could be retasked as a high-endurance AEW and ASW hub to assist in the protection of convoys or carrier strike groups from over-the-horizon threats. This hybrid utility could ensure that even when not being tasked for missions in the High North, the vessel could be an important asset for national and collective defense in other theaters of operations.
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Central to this concept is the integration of a modernized air wing consisting of aircraft such as the CH-148 Cyclone (ASW) and the Bell V-247 Vigilant (AEW). While the Cyclone provides heavy-lift dipping sonar and torpedo delivery for localized anti-submarine warfare, if an AEW variant of the V-247 Vigilant is developed, it could offer the persistent “picket” that current manned Canadian warship platforms lack. With an endurance of up to 15 hours and a service ceiling of 25,000 feet, a hypothetical AEW-configured V-247 could provide the task force with a “radar shield” layer capable of detecting sea-skimming missiles and drones long before they enter the horizon of a shipborne radar like the River-class SPY-7. With Link-16 and militarized SATCOM incorporated, they would significantly enhance the River-class functionality if deployed in a task force.
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The technical viability of this concept is possibly supported by the converging timelines of these programs. The V-247 program is currently maturing through its prototype validation phases, with modular payload designs for AEW and ASW already being considered. Given an ambitious procurement cycle for a major hypothetical “Canadianized” LHD, the V-247 will possibly be an off-the-shelf system by the time such a ship would reach initial operational capability. By deploying such an uncrewed system alongside the Cyclone, a hypothetical Canadian LHD would not just be an amphibious transport, but a 24/7 “Aegis-in-the-Sky” that effectively closes the vulnerability gaps faced by modern naval task forces.
Should Canada look at the Russian 23900 design? It appears to be designed with artic warfare in mind. This speaks to the broader topic of how should the Canadian Armed Forces move forward with their modernization,have they decided what type of force they really want to field, because the increase in budget allows for more flexibility in what you can purchase. The armed forces have usually invested in high end modernization of legacy systems with sprinkles of new systems introduced (for example the new ill purposed OPV) Their procurement must match the type of armed forces they want to field another good example is the F35 debacle currently playing out,if they can acquire LHA’s or LHD’s then would that dictate the f35 bravo? If so then how many of them in order to field them both for the Navy and the RCAF without depleting the numbers from either service?Canada must find a way to balance the duo of quality and quantity in order to make their modernization efforts substantive and to do that will require them to think outside the box some (with common sense of course) for example deal with defense companies who are willing to share their technology and allow for you to build domestically,this way the stagnant Canadian defense sector can begin to revitalize itself and long term that will lead to conversations like this not happening (ideally of course) Also since Canada like to perform dynamic modernization programs,looking at legacy systems to support the operations of an LHA/D type vessel will be beneficial as well, here Canada can look at the Wasp Class LHD which will be phasing out soon ( purchase 4 for what you will spend on newer vessels and modernize them to Canadian standards) now here’s the other part those AV8’s that’s being retired,get’em ,why not (quality and quantity) this way if the RCAF decides not to get the 35B or 35 ,then they will still have a capable maritime CAS asset for those forces being deployed from the LHA/D’s (why don’t the Canadian Army have attack helos , the AH1W will do,along with CH46’s ) Again this conversation speaks to larger issues,one such issue regarding the RCN is should they have a true aircraft carrier,even as a “mid-level” power? That will be dependent again on the military doctrinal policy for the CAF via their foreign policy alignment,a carrier is all about power projection and sovereign mobility,will that benefit Canada? If that is an option then a candidate for that will be the Charles de Gaulle a mid tier Carrier for a mid level power , again a lot of variables will figure into this, but if Canada truly wants to be that higher tier Mid-level power,then wouldn’t that be in the mix? Again the responsible goal will be to balance quality and quantity,in the original case of the LHA/D will it be better to have two of them supported by 4 LPD or LSD type vessels or Multirole type vessels (the NZ Navy Canterbury Class comes to mind) because those big deck amphibious vessels will have to be supported. In an ideal world the RCN could be a 1 carrier,2 lha/d, 4 MRRV or LSD/LPD with the River class and Halifax class (if they’re not being replaced by something newer that is) because those capital ships have to adequately protected right? That’s an ideal world setup,let’s see what the real world outcome will look like for the RCN.
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